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Abstract. Data describing historical growth of income per capita [Gross Domestic Product 
per capita (GDP/cap)] for the world economic growth and for the growth in Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, former USSR, Africa and Latin America are analysed. They 
follow closely the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions represented by the ratios of 
hyperbolic distributions obtained by fitting the GDP and population data. Results of this 
analysis demonstrate that income per capita was increasing monotonically. There was no 
stagnation and there were no transitions from stagnation to growth. The usually postulated 
dramatic escapes from the Malthusian trap never happened because there was no trap in the 
economic growth. Unified Growth Theory is fundamentally incorrect because its central 
postulates are contradicted repeatedly by data, which were used but never analysed during 
the formulation of this theory. The large body of readily-available data opens new avenues 
for the economic and demographic research. They show that certain fundamental postulates 
revolving around the concept of Malthusian stagnation need to be replaced by the evidence-
based interpretations. Within the range of analysable data, which for the growth of 
population extends down to 10,000 BC, growth of human population and economic growth 
were hyperbolic. There was no Malthusian stagnation and there were no transitions to 
distinctly faster trajectories. Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing growth 
trajectories.  
Keywords. Economic growth, Income per capita, Unified Growth Theory, Hyperbolic 
growth, Industrial Revolution, Takeoffs, Malthusian stagnation 
JEL. A10, C12, C20, C50, F00. 
 
1. Introduction 
he aim of this publication is to present the direct proof that contrary to the 
fundamental postulate of the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011) 
distributions describing historical growth of income per capita cannot be 
divided into three, distinctly-different regimes of growth governed by distinctly 
different mechanisms. The indirect proof was presented earlier (Nielsen, 2016a; 
2016c; 2016d) by showing that the historical growth of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and of human population were hyperbolic and that postulated by 
Galor three regimes of growth did not exist. Mathematical analysis of the latest 
data (Maddison, 2001; 2010) brings a new insight into the interpretation of the 
historical economic growth. Within the range of analysable data there was no 
Malthusian stagnation, no alleged takeoffs from stagnation to growth and no 
escapes from the hypothetical Malthusian trap because there was no trap (Nielsen, 
2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f).  
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Unified Growth Theory serves as a good example of traditional interpretations 
of economic growth, interpretations revolving around the concept of Malthusian 
stagnation. It is also a theory, which appears to be based on Maddison’s data 
(Maddison, 2001) but it is not. Ironically, even though these excellent data were 
used during the formulation of this theory, they were never mathematically 
analysed. Unified Growth Theory is not based on the scientific analysis of data but 
on impressions supported by the habitually distorted presentation of data (Ashraf, 
2009; Galor, 2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2010; 2011; 2012a; 
2012b; 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). Data were used 
unprofessionally and they were presented in such a way, intentionally or 
unintentionally, that they appear to support preconceived ideas. However, when 
closely analysed they are found to be in the direct contradiction of the promoted 
concepts, explanation and interpretations.  
Historical economic growth and historical growth of human population were 
hyperbolic (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2016a; 2016b; 2016d; Nielsen, 
2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; Podlazov, 2002; 
Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975). 
Hyperbolic distributions are confusing and they are often misinterpreted in studies 
of economic growth and of the growth of human population. They present an 
image of a slow growth over a long time followed by a fast growth over a short 
time. These distributions are, therefore usually divided into two distinctly-different 
segments, slow and fast. The selected slow segment is then claimed to represent the 
epoch of Malthusian stagnation while the selected fast segment is assumed to 
represent an entirely new type of growth. The alleged transition between these two 
arbitrarily-selected segments is then described as explosion, takeoff, sudden spurt, 
sprint or the dramatic escape from the Malthusian trap. Distinctly-different 
mechanisms are also assigned for the two perceived segments of growth. 
Often, however, interpretations of historical growth are not even based on any 
attempt to examine relevant data. Isolated examples are used to support the concept 
of stagnation followed by explosion. Even worse, more often than not, 
interpretations and explanations are just based on impressions and suppositions. 
Claims of the existence of Malthusian stagnation and transitions to different stages 
of growth are supported by a good dose of creative imagination.  
There is no mathematically justifiable reason for dividing hyperbolic 
distributions into two or three distinctly-different components (Nielsen, 2014). It is 
mathematically impossible to divide hyperbolic distributions into slow and fast 
components. Hyperbolic distributions are slow over a long time and fast over a 
short time but they increase monotonically. Growth rate also increases 
monotonically without any unusual acceleration at any time. It increases 
hyperbolically with time or linearly with the size growing entity (Nielsen, 2016f). 
Concepts of stagnation and takeoffs from stagnation to growth are scientifically 
unjustified. They are contradicted by the analysis of data describing economic 
growth and the growth of population (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2014; 
2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 
1962; 2002; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975). 
Hyperbolic distributions have to be interpreted as a whole and the same 
mechanism has to be used for the apparent slow and for the apparent fast segments. 
These segments do not exist even though they appear to exist. The best way to 
demonstrate that these segments do not exist is by using reciprocal values of 
hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 2014). 
Historical economic growth is even more confusing than the historical growth 
of human population because economic growth is often described using income per 
capita represented by the Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP/cap). It is a 
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ratio of hyperbolic distributions and it creates an even stronger illusion of different 
stages of growth than the illusion created by hyperbolic distributions. It has been 
demonstrated (Nielsen, 2015a) that the characteristic features of the GDP/cap 
distributions, which are interpreted as the epoch of stagnation followed by a sudden 
takeoff, are nothing more than mathematical properties of dividing two hyperbolic 
distributions. It is incorrect to claim that these features characterise uniquely 
economic growth.  
The ratio of two hyperbolic distributions, which includes the GDP/cap ratio, 
increases monotonically and there is no mathematically-justifiable reason for 
dividing them into distinctly different regimes of growth. There is no mathematical 
justification for assigning different mechanisms of growth to the two perceived but 
non-existing segments of income per capita distributions.  
Growth of income per capita was slow over a long time and fast over a short 
time but it was increasing monotonically. The ratio of monotonically-increasing 
hyperbolic distributions can only produce a monotonically-changing distribution, 
increasing or decreasing, depending on the location of singularities of hyperbolic 
distributions (Nielsen, 2015a). Such a ratio cannot produce a distribution with a 
sudden discontinuity, which could be described as a takeoff.  
The growth of income per capita has to be explained by using the same 
mechanism for the whole distribution, slow and fast. We shall now demonstrate 
that the empirical distributions describing income per capita were indeed increasing 
monotonically and that there were no sudden takeoffs from stagnation to growth as 
claimed incorrectly in the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011).  
 
2. Unified Growth Theory 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001, 2010) offer an unprecedented opportunity to 
test the past and present explanations of economic growth and of the growth of 
human population, explanations based on strongly-limited sources of empirical 
information and on creative imagination. Now, this rich body of data brings new 
and refreshing insights into the interpretation of the historical economic growth and 
of the growth of population, interpretations confirmed by other sources of relevant 
data (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook, 1960; Durand, 1967; 1974; 1977; Gallant, 
1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & 
Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994) and by the earlier research 
(Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von 
Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975)    
It is both unfortunate and ironic that Galor had access to all this information but 
failed to use it to make useful contribution to science. He repeatedly distorted 
empirical distributions to support his preconceived ideas. An example of such 
distorted and self-misleading presentations of data is shown in Figure 1 but 
remarkably, precisely the same data, when properly analysed, demonstrate that the 
Unified Growth Theory is fundamentally incorrect. 
Hyperbolic distributions do not have to be distorted to be confusing. They are 
already sufficiently confusing and it is easy to make mistakes with their 
interpretations. Distorted presentations, such as repeatedly used by Galor, make the 
interpretation of these distributions even more difficult. The example presented in 
Figure 1 is based on a figure presented by Galor (2005a, p. 181). Such self-
misleading presentations of data can be expected to lead inevitably to incorrect 
conclusions. It is hard to understand why such distorted diagrams were repeatedly 
used by Galor because the analysis of hyperbolic distributions is trivially simple 
(Nielsen, 2014). 
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The fundamental postulates of the Unified Growth Theory are based on the 
assumption of the existence of three, distinctly-different regimes of economic 
growth: Malthusian regime of stagnation, post-Malthusian regime and the 
sustained-growth regime. According to Galor (2005a; 2008a; 2011; 2012a), 
Malthusian regime of stagnation was between 100,000 BC and AD 1750 for 
developed regions and between 100,000 BC and AD 1900 for less-developed 
regions. The post-Malthusian regime was allegedly between AD 1750 and 1850 for 
developed regions and from 1900 for less-developed regions. The sustained-growth 
regime was supposed to have commenced around 1850 for developed regions. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of the ubiquitous, grossly-distorted and self-misleading diagrams used 
to create the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011). Maddison’s data (Maddison, 
2001) were used during the formulation of this theory but they were never analysed. Such 
state-of-the-art was used to construct a system of scientifically-unsupported interpretations, 
explanations and “mysteries of the growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220).   
 
The end of the regime of Malthusian stagnation was supposed to have been 
characterised by dramatic takeoffs from stagnation to growth, described as a 
―remarkable‖ or ―stunning‖ escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 
177, 220). It is a signature, which cannot be missed. This change in the pattern of 
growth is described as ―the sudden take-off from stagnation to growth‖ (Galor, 
2005a, pp. 177, 220, 277) or as a ―sudden spurt‖ (Galor, 2005a, 177, 220). 
According to Galor, the end of the Malthusian regime of stagnation for developed 
regions coincides with the Industrial Revolution. ―The take-off of developed 
regions from the Malthusian Regime was associated with the Industrial 
Revolution‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 185). Indeed, the Industrial Revolution is considered 
to have been ―the prime engine of economic growth‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 212). 
For developed regions, the postulated sudden takeoffs from stagnation to 
growth is supposed to have occurred around AD 1750, or around the time of the 
Industrial Revolution, 1760-1840 (Floud & McCloskey, 1994). For less-developed 
regions, the takeoff was allegedly around 1900. A transition from growth to growth 
is not a signature of the postulated sudden takeoff from stagnation to growth. Thus, 
for instance, a transition from hyperbolic growth to another hyperbolic growth or to 
some other steadily-increasing trajectory is not a signature of the sudden takeoff 
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from stagnation to growth. Likewise, a transition at a distinctly different time is not 
a confirmation of the theoretical expectations.  
In the diagrams presented below, income per capita (GDP/cap) is in 1990 
International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
 
3. Hyperbolic growth 
It has been shown earlier that over the range of analysable data historical 
growth of population and historical economic growth were hyperbolic (Nielsen, 
2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f). For the economic 
growth, the range of analysable data extends down to AD 1 but for the growth of 
the world population it extends to 10,000 BC. These results are consistent with the 
analysis carried out over 50 years ago for the growth of the world population 
during the AD era (von Foerster, Mora, & Amiot, 1960) and with other similar 
studies (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; 
von Hoerner, 1975) 
Demographic and economic research has to be based on the acceptance of 
hyperbolic descriptions of the historical growth of population and of the historical 
economic growth. Hyperbolic growth, confirmed repeatedly and consistently by 
data (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook, 1960; Durand, 1967; 1974; 1977; Gallant, 
1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & 
Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994) leaves no room for the outdated 
interpretations revolving around the concept of Malthusian stagnation followed by 
sudden takeoffs to a distinctly faster growth. Mathematical analysis of data 
contradicts consistently and repeatedly these hypothetical but unsupported 
concepts, including the concept that the Industrial Revolution changed the relevant 
growth trajectories. It did not.    
Hyperbolic distribution describing growth is represented by a reciprocal of a 
linear function:  
 
1
( )S t
a kt


,                   (1) 
 
where ( )S t  is the size of the hyperbolically growing entity (e.g. the GDP or the 
size of the population), while a and k are positive constants.  
Distribution describing the time-dependence of income per capita (GDP/cap) is 
the ratio of two hyperbolic distributions: the hyperbolic distribution describing the 
growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a) and the hyperbolic distribution describing the 
growth of population (Nielsen, 2016d). A GDP/cap distribution can be also 
interpreted as a ratio of two linearly decreasing distributions describing the 
respective reciprocal values or as a product of a hyperbolic distribution 
representing the GDP and a linear function representing the reciprocal values of the 
size of the population. Consequently, the GDP/cap ratio can be simply described as 
the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution, where the linear modulation of the 
GDP distribution is done by the reciprocal values of the size of population 
(Nielsen, 2015a). 
 
4. Growth of the world GDP/cap 
Results of mathematical analysis of the world GDP/cap are presented in Figure 
2. The fitted distribution represents the linearly-modulated GDP distribution 
(Nielsen, 2015a). Parameters describing the GDP data are 2
1 1.684 10a
  and
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6
1 8.539 10k
  while the parameters describing the world population data are  
0
2 7.73 19 0a   and
3
2 3.76 15 0k
  .  
For the growth of the world GDP/cap we should see the signature of two 
takeoffs: around AD 1750 for developed regions and around AD 1900 for less-
developed regions, yet we see none of them. There was no stagnation before the 
Industrial Revolution and no transition from stagnation to growth around AD 1750 
for developed regions or around AD 1900 for less-developed regions, as claimed 
by Galor (2008a; 2012a).  
 
Figure 2. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing growth of the world income per 
capita (GDP/cap) are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution 
(Nielsen, 2015a) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 2016a; 2016d). 
The alleged takeoffs from stagnation to growth around AD 1750 for developed regions and 
around 1900 for less-developed regions, as claimed by Galor (2008a; 2012a), did not 
happen. Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing the trajectory describing the 
growth of income per capita (GDP/cap). 
 
The data show a minor disturbance around AD 1900 which looks like a minor 
boosting. However, it is definitely not a ―remarkable‖ or ―stunning‖ escape from 
the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) because (1) the growth deviated 
only slightly from the historical trajectory, (2) this minor deviation was not 
preceded by stagnation and (3) because it was only temporary disturbance and the 
growth soon returned to the original trajectory. Furthermore, rather than being 
permanently and spectacularly propelled along a distinctly new trajectory, as 
implied by Galor’s claims of ―remarkable‖ and ―stunning‖ takeoffs (Galor, 2005a, 
pp. 177, 220), economic growth as described by data, started to be diverted to a 
slower trajectory. There was definitely no transition from stagnation to growth. 
There was no dramatic escape from the Malthusian trap because there was no trap 
in the growth of income per capita. 
 
5. Western Europe 
Growth of the GDP/cap in Western Europe is shown in Figure 3. Maddison’s 
data (Maddison, 2010) are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
distribution obtained by dividing two hyperbolic distributions: the distribution 
describing the growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a) and the distribution describing 
the growth of population (Nielsen, 2016d). Parameters describing the displayed 
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curve are:  2
1 9.859 10a
  and 51 5.112 10k
  for the GDP and  
1
2 7.54 12 0a   and
2
2 3.74 19 0k
  for the growth of the population. 
Results presented in Figure 3 are particularly important because they show that 
contrary to the generally accepted interpretations, Industrial Revolution had 
absolutely no impact on changing the growth trajectory of income per capita in the 
region where its impact should have been most pronounced. Galor’s claim that the 
Industrial Revolution was ―the prime engine of economic growth‖ (Galor, 2005a, 
p. 212) is remarkably contradicted by the same data, which he used during the 
formulation of his theory. This and other examples show how important 
Maddison’s data are in correcting the outdated interpretations of the historical 
economic growth.  
 
 
Figure 3. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in Western Europe are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
distribution (Nielsen, 2015a) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 
2016a; 2016d). The alleged takeoff from stagnation to growth around AD 1750 (Galor, 
2008a; 2012a) did not happen. Industrial Revolution had no impact on the trajectory 
describing the growth of income per capita (GDP/cap). The analysis of data used by Galor 
shows that “the prime engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212) had absolutely 
no impact on changing the economic growth trajectory in the region where this “engine” 
should have been most effective and where its impacts should have been most pronounced. 
From around AD 1900, the growth of the GDP/cap started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory. 
 
It has been shown earlier (Nielsen, 2016a) that economic growth was hyperbolic 
not only for the total of 30 countries of Western Europe but also for the four 
countries, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, described by the most 
complete sets of data and representing the most advanced economies. For these 
countries, hyperbolic growth was between AD 1 and 1875 when it started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory. There was no Malthusian stagnation, no takeoff and 
no escape from the Malthusian trap, because there was no trap. Industrial 
Revolution had absolutely no impact on changing economic growth trajectories in 
these four progressive countries where the impact of this revolution should be 
clearly demonstrated in the economic growth data.   
Analysis of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) demonstrates that the 
―remarkable‖ or ―stunning‖ escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 
177, 220) never happened because there was no trap in the growth of income per 
capita. Whether expressed in terms of the GDP or GDP/cap, economic growth was 
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remarkably undisturbed during the time of the Industrial Revolution and continued 
undisturbed until around 1900, when it started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. 
 
6. Eastern Europe 
Results of analysis of the growth of income per capita in Eastern Europe are 
summarized in Figure 4. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) are compared with the 
linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution obtained by dividing two hyperbolic 
distributions: the distribution describing the growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a) 
and the distribution describing the growth of population (Nielsen, 2016d). 
Parameters describing the fitted GDP/cap distribution are:  1
1 7.749 10a
  and
4
1 4.048 10k
  for the GDP and  22 3.05 15 0a   and
1
2 1.52 15 0k
  for the 
growth of the population. 
 
Figure 4. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in Eastern Europe are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
distribution (Nielsen, 2015a) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 
2016a; 2016d). The alleged takeoff from stagnation to growth around AD 1750 (Galor, 
2008a; 2012a) did not happen. Industrial Revolution had no impact on the trajectory 
describing the growth of income per capita (GDP/cap). From around AD 1850, rather than 
being boosted by the Industrial Revolution, the growth of the GDP/cap started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory. 
 
Growth of income per capita was slow but it was not stagnant. It was following 
the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. Industrial Revolution had 
absolutely no impact on shaping the growth trajectory. The ―stunning‖ takeoff 
postulated by Galor did not happen. His theory is repeatedly and consistently 
contradicted by the data he used during the formulation of his theory. Rather than 
being boosted by the Industrial Revolution, the growth of the GDP/cap started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory from as early as around AD 1850. 
 
7. Former USSR 
Results of analysis of the growth of income per capita in the former USSR are 
summarized in Figure 5.Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) are compared with the 
linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution obtained by dividing two hyperbolic 
distributions: the distribution describing the growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a) 
and the distribution describing the growth of population (Nielsen, 2016d). 
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Parameters describing the fitted GDP/cap distribution are:  1
1 6.547 10a
  and
4
1 3.452 10k
  for the GDP and  22 2.61 18 0a   and
1
2 1.33 13 0k
  for the 
growth of the population. 
 
Figure 5.Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in the former USSR are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
distribution (Nielsen, 2015a) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 
2016a; 2016d). The alleged takeoff from stagnation to growth around AD 1750 (Galor, 
2008a; 2012a) did not happen. Industrial Revolution had no impact on the trajectory 
describing the growth of income per capita (GDP/cap). From around AD 1870, rather than 
being boosted by the Industrial Revolution, the growth of the GDP/cap started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory. 
 
Growth of income per capita in the countries of the former USSR was following 
closely the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution from AD 1. The growth was 
slow but not stagnant. Growth of the GDP and population were monotonic 
(Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d) and consequently the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) was also monotonic. The ―remarkable‖ or ―stunning‖ takeoff (Galor, 
2005a, pp. 177, 220) claimed by Galor never happened. This wished-for feature is 
repeatedly contradicted by the analysis of economic and population data (Nielsen, 
2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f) and by the analysis of 
the GDP/cap distributions. Soon after the alleged, but non-existent sudden takeoff 
from the non-existent stagnation to growth, the growth of income per capita in 
countries of the former USSR started to be diverted to a new and slower trajectory. 
 
8. Asia 
Analysis of the growth of income per capita (GDP/cap) in Asia (including 
Japan) is summarised in Figure 6. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) are compared 
with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution obtained by dividing two 
hyperbolic distributions: the distribution describing the growth of the GDP 
(Nielsen, 2016a) and the distribution describing the growth of the population 
(Nielsen, 2016d). Parameters describing the fitted GDP/cap distribution are:  
2
1 2.303 10a
  and 51 1.129 10k
  for the GDP and 12 1.06 18 0a   and
3
2 4.99 19 0k
  for the growth of population. 
Asia is made primarily of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) 
so the alleged ―stunning‖ takeoff from the alleged stagnation to growth should have 
occurred around AD 1900 (Galor, 2008a; 2012a). The data show a certain degree 
of boosting shortly after the time of the claimed ―stunning‖ takeoff from stagnation 
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to growth. However, this boosting is not a transition from stagnation to growth 
because the preceding trajectory was not stagnant and because the boosted 
trajectory follows closely the historical trend. It was obviously only a temporary 
boosting because the boosted trajectory is progressively coming closer to the 
historical trajectory and judging by its decreasing gradient it is likely to move to 
the other side. 
The growth of income per capita in the past was slow but it is the 
mathematically-expected characteristic of dividing two hyperbolic trajectories 
(Nielsen, 2015a). To claim Malthusian stagnation, we would have to demonstrate 
Malthusian oscillation during that time. Obviously they are missing in this display 
and in the display of the GDP and population distributions (Nielsen, 2016a; 
2016d).  
 
Figure 6.Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in Asia are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution 
(Nielsen, 2015a) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 2016a; 2016d). 
The boosting, which commenced around AD 1950 follows closely the original historical 
trajectory and is likely to cross it and move to the other side. This temporary disturbance is 
a part of the commonly-observed recent transitions to slower trajectories. The only 
difference in this case is that the transition to a slower trajectory was preceded by a 
relatively minor boosting.     
 
The observed boosting could be probably explained by Japan’s contribution to 
the total GDP/cap. Until 1900, Japan’s contribution was less than 5% but by 1950 
it gradually increased to 12% and by 2000 it climbed to 20%. Japan belongs to the 
more-developed countries so according to Galor (2008a; 2012a) it should have 
experienced ―remarkable‖ and ―stunning‖ takeoff (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) in 
its GDP/cap around 1750 but it did not. On the other hand, Asia should have 
experienced a sudden explosion in the GDP/cap growth around 1900 but it did not. 
It did experience a minor boosting close to that time but as already pointed out this 
minor boosting is probably associated with the increased economic activity in 
Japan. There was no dramatic transition from stagnation to growth as claimed by 
Galor but only a transition from the non-stagnant, linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
trajectory to a temporarily faster growth, which appears to have been caused 
primarily, if not entirely, by the increasing contribution of Japan’s economy, the 
contribution, which should have commenced explosively around 1750 but it did 
not. Impressions prompted by wished-for features and reinforced by distorted 
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presentations of data such as shown in Figure 1 could be persuasive but they can be 
also strongly misleading. Data have to be rigorously analysed. 
 
9. Africa 
Results of analysis of the growth of income per capita in Africa are presented in 
Figure 7. As demonstrated earlier (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d), the GDP and 
population data for Africa can be fitted using two hyperbolic distributions, a slow 
distribution followed by a fast distribution. The transition from the slow to fast 
distribution occurred around 1820 for the growth of the GDP and around 1840 for 
the growth of population. 
Parameters describing the fitted GDP/cap distribution between AD 1 and 1820 
are:  1
1 1.244 10a
  and 51 5.030 10k
  for the GDP and 12 5.79 14 0a   and
2
2 2.47 13 0k
  for the growth of the population. For the GDP/cap distribution 
from AD 1840, parameters are: 1
1 4.192 10a
  and 41 2.126 10k
  for the 
GDP and 2
2 1.57 11 0a   and
2
2 7.83 14 0k
  . The fit to the transient region 
between AD 1820 and 1840 was obtained by polynomial interpolation.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in Africa are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions 
(Nielsen, 2015a) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 2016a; 2016d). 
The alleged takeoff from stagnation to growth around AD 1900 for less-developed regions 
(Galor, 2008a; 2012a) did not happen because the GDP/cap trajectory was not stagnant 
before that year and because it continued undisturbed after this year until around 1950 
when it started to be diverted to a slower trajectory.  
 
Africa presents an interesting and unique case when the singularity for the 
hyperbolic trajectory describing the growth of population between AD 1 and 1840 
is earlier than the singularity for the hyperbolic trajectory describing the growth of 
the GDP between AD 1 and 1820. For the growth of the population, the point of 
singularity is at 2343t  while for the growth of the GDP it is at 2473t    
(Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d).  
For the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution the escape to infinity at a 
fixed time occurs when the singularity for the growth of the GDP is earlier than the 
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singularity for the growth of population (Nielsen, 2015a). If the singularity for the 
growth of population occurs earlier, as in Africa, then the GDP/cap ratio decreases 
slowly with time and then escapes rapidly to zero at the time of the singularity for 
the growth of population. The decreasing GDP/cap distribution between AD 1 and 
the early 1800s in Africa does not represent an unusual and distinctly new 
mechanism of economic growth but simply the mathematical property of dividing 
two hyperbolic distributions describing the growth of the GDP and population. In 
particular, it does not represent Malthusian stagnation because both the GDP and 
the population were increasing hyperbolically (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). It simply 
shows that the growth of population was just slightly faster than the economic 
growth. In all other regions, and globally, the past economic growth was faster than 
the growth of population, the unwelcome situation because if both trajectories are 
hyperbolic, such a growth leads eventually to excessively fast-increasing 
trajectories of income per capita, which, if unchecked, increase to infinity at a fixed 
time.  
The best but still not the ideal solution would be to keep the economic growth 
and the growth of population increasing at approximately the same rate. In such a 
case, we could avoid approaching a critical growth in the income per capita. 
However, the problem of the growth of population and of the economic growth 
would still remain unsolved. Both cannot growth indefinitely and it does not matter 
whether they follow hyperbolic trajectories or some other increasing trajectories. 
The past economic growth in Africa was close to a perfect balance between the 
economic growth and the growth of population. However, between AD 1820 and 
1840, this nearly perfect balance changed dramatically to resemble the generally 
experienced trend of reckless and irresponsible economic growth. It does not mean 
that a secure economic growth can be only achieved by adopting primitive living 
conditions. Progress can be made but there is a limit to how much such a progress 
can be supported by the availability of natural resources. The current global 
economic growth is insecure (Nielsen, 2015b) 
Africa is made of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) so 
according to Galor (2008a; 2012a) it should have experienced stagnation until 
around AD 1900 followed by a clear takeoff around that year. These expectations 
are contradicted by data.   
In contradiction of Galor’s interpretations of economic growth (Galor, 2005a, 
2008a; 2011; 2012a), the Malthusian regime of stagnation did not exist. The GDP 
and population were increasing hyperbolically during the entire time of the alleged 
but non-existent regime of Malthusian stagnation, from AD 1 to 1900 and even 
after that year. Unrecognised by Galor (because he did not analyse data but 
preferred to use distorted diagrams) there was a transition between two hyperbolic 
trajectories during his assumed but non-existent regime of Malthusian stagnation, 
transition from a slowly decreasing income per capita described by the linearly-
modulated hyperbolic trajectory to a fast increasing trajectory. When studied 
separately, it was a transition from slow hyperbolic growth of the GDP or 
population to a fast increasing hyperbolic growth. It was not a transition from 
stagnation to growth, claimed erroneously by Galor, but transition from growth to 
growth.    
Africa is the only region where the economic growth was boosted at the time of 
the Industrial Revolution but it is also the poorest region, where the claimed 
Malthusian stagnation should have been most clearly demonstrated. According to 
Galor, Malthusian stagnation should have prevailed in Africa until around 1900 
(Galor, 2008a; 2012a). This hypothesis, which appears to have been confirmed by 
his manipulation of data, is clearly and convincingly contradicted by their 
mathematical analysis.  
Turkish Economic Review 
 TER, 3(2), R.W. Nielsen. p.300-319. 
312 
312 
Analysis of data describing the GDP and population in Africa shows that there 
was no stagnation over the entire range of the AD era (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). 
Economic growth (as described by the GDP) and the growth of population were 
following the steadily-increasing and undisturbed hyperbolic trajectories but 
around the time of the Industrial Revolution they were diverted to faster hyperbolic 
trajectories. There are no signs of Malthusian stagnation before and after the 
Industrial Revolution and before AD 1900, which was supposed to mark the end of 
the epoch of Malthusian stagnation. Hyperbolic growth, even if slow, does not 
represent Malthusian stagnation. Convincing signature of Malthusian stagnation is 
in the form of random fluctuations often described as Malthusian oscillations. This 
signature is missing in the data for Africa and for other regions. Data for Africa and 
for other regions, show steadily-increasing hyperbolic distributions describing 
economic growth and the growth of population (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). 
Analysis of the GDP/cap data for Africa shows that after a transition from a 
slowly-decreasing trajectory before around 1840 (which as we have pointed out 
does not represent Malthusian stagnation but the mathematical property of dividing 
monotonically-increasing hyperbolic trajectories) the growth of the GDP/cap in 
Africa was following a vigorously-increasing trajectory during the alleged 
Malthusian stagnation. So while the suitable manipulation of data (Galor, 2008a; 
2012a) appears to be confirming preconceived ideas, mathematical analysis of 
precisely the same data shows that the preconceived ideas are clearly incorrect. 
Here it might be a good place to point out that harsh and primitive living 
conditions in the past should not be immediately interpreted as a proof of the 
existence of Malthusians stagnation. Africa is at present the poorest region. It is 
also the only region where the growth of income per capita was negative over 
hundreds of years, between AD 1 and 1840 but there was no Malthusian stagnation 
in the growth of population and in the economic growth in Africa (Nielsen, 2016a; 
2016d). There was also no Malthusian stagnation in other regions. Living 
conditions in the past in all regions were primitive and often harsh by modern 
standards and yet in all of them there was no Malthusian stagnation in the 
economic growth and in the growth of population. Worldwide, living conditions in 
the distant past were harsh and primitive and yet for as long as we can trace it by 
using analysable data, for a time extending down to 10,000 BC, there was no 
Malthusian stagnation in the growth of human population. With the exception of 
just two past and relatively brief transitions, the world growth of population was 
hyperbolic for nearly 12,000 years (Nielsen, 2016b).  
Mathematical analysis of data finds no confirmation of the existence of the 
hypothetical epoch of Malthusian stagnation. It is a vague concept, which has no 
application in the explanation of the dynamics of economic and demographic 
growth. Its continuing presence in academic discussions as a tool to explain the 
dynamics of growth is not only irrelevant but also counterproductive because it 
diverts attention form finding correct explanations of the mechanism of the growth 
process. 
It is also useful to compare results of the analysis for Africa with the results for 
Western Europe. Industrial Revolution, ―the prime engine of economic growth‖ 
(Galor, 2005a, p. 212) should have worked most efficiently in Western Europe and 
its effects should have been most convincingly confirmed by data in this region, 
but these effects are convincingly contradicted by data: the alleged engine did not 
change the economic growth or the growth of population trajectories in Western 
Europe. Likewise, Malthusian stagnation should have been most prominently 
confirmed in Africa but it is not. There was never any form of stagnation in the 
economic growth in Africa.  
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Furthermore, while in Western Europe, Industrial Revolution had absolutely no 
impact on changing the economic growth trajectory, in Africa there was a 
spectacular acceleration of growth during the time of the Industrial Revolution but 
it was not the acceleration from stagnation to growth but from growth to growth. 
The wished-for features are contradicted by data showing that even plausible 
stories and explanations should not be accepted in science unless they can be 
confirmed by relevant data; otherwise they are at best just interesting stories with 
no scientific merit. 
The alleged sudden acceleration (takeoff) in income per capita is supposed to 
have been associated with the benefits of progress such as better health care, better 
housing, better education, higher standard of living and generally better living 
conditions. However, data show that in Europe there was no takeoff in the income 
per capita at the time of the Industrial Revolution, while in Africa there was a 
dramatic acceleration without a dramatic improvement in the style of living. On the 
contrary, this dramatic boosting in income per capita in Africa at the time of the 
Industrial Revolution appears to coincide with the dramatic deterioration of living 
conditions of native populations. It occurred around the time of the intensified 
colonisation of Africa (Duignan & Gunn, 1973; McKay, et al., 2012; Pakenham, 
1992).  
If a sudden takeoff is supposed to mark the ―remarkable‖ or ―stunning‖ escape 
from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220), then the only such takeoff 
occurred in Africa. However, this dramatic takeoff did not mark the transition from 
stagnation to growth, because there was no stagnation. It also did not mark the 
dramatic escape from the Malthusian trap because there was no Malthusian trap in 
the economic growth or in the growth of population in Africa: both were increasing 
hyperbolically before the claimed but non-existent takeoff around AD 1900. The 
sudden and steep change in the economic growth and in the growth of population 
in Africa between AD 1820 and 1840did not mark the dramatic escape from the 
hypothetical Malthusian trap but the transition from freedom and independence to 
the trap of misery, deprivation and suffering of the native population. Poetic 
explanations could be interesting but they are not necessarily scientifically sound. 
Creative imagination can play an important role in science as long as it is tested by 
the scientific process of investigation.   
 
10. Latin America 
Results of analysis of economic growth in Latin America are presented in 
Figure 8. Data for Latin America contain a discontinuity in the growth of the GDP 
and population between AD 1500 and 1600 (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). This 
discontinuity is reflected in the discontinuity of the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap).  
Parameters describing the slowly-increasing, linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
trajectory are 1
1 4.421 10a
  and 41 2.09 13 0k
  for the GDP and
2
2 1.765 10a   and
2
2 8.24 12 0k
  for the population. The fast-increasing 
trajectory from AD 1600 is described by the following parameters:
0
1 1.57 10 0a  
and
4
1 8.22 14 0k
  for the GDP and 22 6.56 11 0a   and
1
2 3.37 11 0k
    for 
the population. The discontinuity in the economic growth and in the growth of 
population coincides with the onset of Spanish conquest (Bethell, 1984). However, 
after this relatively brief delay, economic growth and the growth of human 
population were following fast-increasing hyperbolic trajectories.  
Latin America is also made of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 
2011) so again, according to Galor (2008a; 2012a), the growth of income per capita 
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(GDP/cap) in this region should have been stagnant until around AD 1900 and fast 
from around that year. This pattern of growth is contradicted by data. Data show a 
diametrically different pattern: (1) there is no convincing evidence of the existence 
of stagnation over the entire range of time between AD 1 and 1900 (convincing 
evidence of Malthusian stagnation requires the presence of random fluctuations) 
but there is a sufficiently convincing evidence of the linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
growth particularly between AD 1600 and 1900; (2) there was no takeoff from 
stagnation to growth at any time; and (3) at the time of the postulated takeoff in 
1900 the growth of income per capita started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. 
The wished-for takeoff is replaced by a slower growth. However, even if we had a 
takeoff around that time it would have been a takeoff of a different kind, not a 
takeoff from stagnation to growth as required by the Unified Growth Theory 
(Galor, 2005a; 2011) but a takeoff from growth to growth. 
 
 
Figure 8. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in Latin America are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
distributions (Nielsen, 2015a) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 
2016a; 2016d). There was a discontinuity in the economic growth and in the growth of 
population between AD 1500 and 1600 reflected in the discontinuity in the GDP/cap 
distribution. The alleged takeoff from stagnation to growth around AD 1900 (Galor, 2008a; 
2012a) did not happen because the GDP/cap trajectory was not stagnant before that year 
and because there was no sudden acceleration in growth around that year. On the 
contrary, around the alleged takeoff there was a transition to a slower trajectory. 
 
 
11. Summary and conclusions 
Results of mathematical analysis of the historical income per capita (GDP/cap) 
distributions are summarised in Table 1. Listed parameters ( 1a , 1k , 2a , 2k )describe 
the fitted, linearly-modulated hyperbolic trajectories (Nielsen, 2015a) represented 
by the ratios of hyperbolic distributions describing the growth of the GDP and 
population. Parameters 1a and 1k describe hyperbolic distributions fitting the GDP 
data (Nielsen, 2016a), while parameters 2a and 2k describe hyperbolic distributions 
fitting population data (Nielsen, 2016d).  
Results of this analysis demonstrate explicitly that the postulated by Galor 
(2005a; 2008a; 2011; 2012a) takeoffs in the income per capita (GDP/cap) did not 
happen. There were no transitions from stagnation to growth because within the 
mathematically-analysable data Galor’s regime of Malthusian stagnation did not 
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exist in the growth of income per capita. Growth of income per capita was 
following the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions until recently when it 
started to be diverted to slower trajectories.  
Galor’s Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011) is contradicted yet again 
by data. The ―remarkable‖ and ―stunning’ escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 
2005a, pp. 177, 220) never happened because there was no trap in the economic 
growth and in the growth of population. His claim of the existence of the 
differential timing of takeoffs is also contradicted by data because we cannot have 
differential timing of takeoffs without takeoffs. Galor describes phenomena that 
did not exist. His explanations of economic growth are based on phantom features 
created by hyperbolic illusions and magnified by his habitually distorted 
presentations of data such as illustrated in Figure 1. His theory is irrelevant and 
misleading. 
Galor had access to the excellent data of Maddison (2001). He even used them 
during the formulation of his theory but he did not attempt to analyse them, which 
is surprising because their analysis is trivially simple (Nielsen, 2014). Now, 
precisely the same data can be used to demonstrate that his Unified Growth Theory 
(Galor, 2005a; 2011) is repeatedly contradicted by data (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 
2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f).  
 
Table 1.Summary of the mathematical analysis ofthe historical income per capita 
(GDP/cap) distributions 
Region 
1a  1k  2a  2k  
Stagna
tion 
Take
off 
World 21.684 10  68.539 10  07.739 10  33.765 10
 
X X 
Western Europe 29.859 10  55.112 10  17.542 10  23.749 10
 
X X 
Eastern Europe 17.749 10  44.048 10  23.055 10  11.525 10  
X X 
Former USSR 16.547 10  43.452 10  22.618 10  11.333 10  X X 
Asia 22.303 10  51.129 10  11.068 10  34.999 10
 
X X 
Africa 
 
11.244 10  
14.192 10  
55.030 10  
42.126 10  
15.794 10  
21.571 10  
22.473 10
 
27.834 10
 
X X 
Latin America 
 
14.421 10  
01.570 10  
42.093 10  
48.224 10  
21.765 10  
26.561 10  
28.242 10
 
13.371 10  
X X 
Notes: 1a , 1k , 2a , 2k – Parameters describing linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions (ratios of 
hyperbolic distributions). Parameters 1a , 1k describe hyperbolic growth of the GDP, while 2a , 2k
describe hyperbolic growth of population [see eqn (1)]. X – No stagnation/takeoff. Within the range 
of the mathematically-analysable data the claimed by Galor (2005a; 2008a; 2011; 2012a) 
Malthusian regime of stagnation did not exist. The claimed takeoffs from stagnation to growth 
never happened. 
 
Unified Growth Theory is fundamentally incorrect and scientifically 
unacceptable. It is a theory based on scientifically unsupported concepts created by 
impressions and reinforced by the manipulation of data. Excellent data of 
Maddison (2001) were not analysed but presented repeatedly using distorted and 
misleading diagrams such as shown in Figure 1. Such distorted presentation of data 
appears not only ubiquitously in the Unified Growth Theory but also in other 
related publications (Ashraf, 2009; Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a; 2005b; 2007; 
2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; 
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Snowdon & Galor, 2008).  Selected but meaningless and misleading values of data 
were also repeatedly quoted to support the concept of stagnation followed by 
takeoffs from stagnation to growth. This is an unscientific approach to research.  
Galor’s handling of data is puzzling. Maybe he does not know how to analyse 
data, but this conclusion is hard to accept because he appears to be familiar with 
mathematics and the analysis of hyperbolic distributions is trivially simple 
(Nielsen, 2014). It looks as if, for whatever reason, he purposefully manipulated 
data to support his preconceived ideas. 
Assisted by the excellent data of Maddison (2001) available to him at the time 
of the formulation of his theory, Galor was on the verge of making an important 
contribution to science by showing that economic growth was hyperbolic, in 
agreement with what has been already known about the growth of population 
(Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von 
Hoerner, 1975).  He would have discovered that there was no Malthusian 
stagnation and no takeoffs from stagnation to growth the economic growth, the 
features which were not confirmed in the published results describing the growth of 
population. However, he missed this excellent opportunity because he failed to 
follow the fundamental principles of scientific investigation, which require that 
theories should be tested by data and that research should be guided and moderated 
by data. 
The most plausible explanation why Galor appears to have been reluctant to be 
guided by data and why he apparently manipulated data to support his 
preconceived ideas is that he was blinded by prejudice. It is a kind of fear or 
reluctance to accept evidence contradicting the established knowledge. 
Psychologists describe it as cascade behaviour, information cascade, informational 
avalanche, illusion of truth, illusory truth, illusion of familiarity, running with the 
pack, following the crowd, herding behaviour, bandwagons and path depending 
choice (Anderson & Holt, 1997; Begg, Anas & Farinacci, 1992; Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer & Welch, 1992; De Vany & Lee, 2008; De Vany & Walls, 1999; 
Easley & Kleinberg, 2010; Grebe, Schmid & Stiehler, 2008; Ondrias, 1999; Parks 
& Tooth, 2006; Ramsey, Raafat, Chater & Frith, 2009; Walden & Browne, 2003).  
In the demographic and economic research this phenomenon is demonstrated by 
the reluctance to accept the compelling contradicting evidence in data simply 
because many demographers or economists would not agree with the contradicting 
evidence. It is safer to follow the crowd and run with the pack. Tradition is stronger 
than science and only an outsider who has not been blinded by prejudice and who 
is not afraid of being rejected by the crowd might dare to show that the accepted 
doctrines are incorrect. He or she is then likely to be ridiculed and rejected but 
science is a self-correcting discipline so sooner or later such resistance to accept 
the overwhelming empirical evidence will have to be broken, but it would be better 
for science and scientists if the required change in the paradigm is accepted sooner 
rather than later.  
The evidence contradicting currently-accepted interpretations is overwhelming: 
historical economic growth and historical growth of population were hyperbolic 
(Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 
2016e; 2016f; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Foerster, Mora & 
Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975). Hyperbolic growth should be the basis for 
explaining the mechanism of the historical growth of population and of the 
historical economic growth. 
Interpretations revolving around the concept of Malthusian stagnation and 
around assumed transitions from stagnation to growth are repeatedly and 
consistently contradicted by data and by their mathematical analyses. Historical 
economic growth and historical growth of population cannot be divided into 
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distinctly different regimes governed by distinctly different mechanisms of growth. 
Hyperbolic growth has to be explained as a whole. The same mechanism has to be 
applied to the slow and fast hyperbolic growth because it is mathematically 
impossible to divide hyperbolic distributions into distinctly different sections 
(Nielsen, 2014). Once we can explain properly the mechanism of the past growth 
we might be able to understand better the current growth and how it should be 
controlled.  
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